Banking in Computable General Equilibrium Economies by Díaz-Giménez, Javier et al.
This is a postprint version of the following published document:
 Díaz-Giménez, Javier; Prescott, Edward C.; Fitzgerald, Terry; Álvarez, Fernando;. 
Banking in Computable General Equilibrium Economies. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, July-Oct. 1992, vol. 16, n. 3-4, p. 533-559. ISSN 
0165-1889. Available in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(92)90048-J
© Elsevier Science Publishers
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- 
                                NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
1Banking in computable general 
equilibrium economies* 
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Carlos Ill Unicersity, Madrid, Spain 
Edward C. Prescott, Terry Fitzgerald, and Fernando Alvarez 
UniL·ersity of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN 55480, USA 
In this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium economy that models the banking 
sector explicitly. Banks intermediate between households and between the household sector and 
the government sector. Households borrow from banks to finance their purchases of houses and 
they lend to banks to save for retirement. Banks pool households' savings and they purchase 
interest-bearing government debt and non-interest-bearing reserves. We use this structure to 
answer two sets of questions: one normative in nature that evaluates the welfare costs of 
alternative monetary and tax policies, and one positive in nature that studies the real effects of 
following a procyclical interest-rate policy rule. 
1. Introduction 
Existing quantitative general equilibrium models abstract from costly fi-
nancial intermediation and from the large differences between the average 
rates at which households and businesses borrow from and lend to banks and 
other financial intermediaries. 1 In our opinion, the main reason for this 
abstraction is not the lack of interest in the quantitative behavior of economies 
that model the banking sector explicitly, but rather a lack of tools to compute 
the equilibrium processes of these model economies. These computational 
difficulties arise because the agent-type heterogeneity needed to model 
financial intermediation results in a high-dimensional state variable that 
precludes the use of standard recursive computational methods. 
*Financial support from the NSF and the Direcci6n General de Investigaci6n, Ciencia y 
Tecnologfa is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors. 
1Rios-Rull (1990) has a quantitative general equilibrium model with borrowing and lending 
between generations. There, however, intermediation is costless, so borrowing and lending rates 
are equal. 
2Both theoretical and empirical findings motivate our interest in com-
putable economies that model financial intermediation explicitly. On the 
empirical side, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have amassed an impressive 
amount of statistical evidence to support their view that monetary policy 
shocks can contribute to economic fluctuations and that the contribution of 
these shocks to U.S. business cycles fluctuations has been important. On the 
basis of this statistical evidence, Friedman and Schwartz conclude that of the 
six severe contractions in the U.S. economy after 1867, four involved major 
disruptions in the banking system. On the theoretical side, some nonquantita-
tive models support Friedman and Schwartz's view that even shocks to the 
economy that have a small effect on aggregate production possibilities may 
end up having large aggregate consequences due to their interaction with the 
financial intermediation sector. Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989), Greenwood and Williamson (1989), and Williamson (1987) have 
developed such models. We consider these theoretical papers to be an 
important first step in the understanding of the interaction between financial 
intermediation and the business cycle. The obvious next step in this research 
program is to build quantitative general equilibrium models in which costly 
financial intermediation is explicitly modeled. 
In this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium economy which 
includes both aggregate uncertainty and an explicit banking sector that 
intermediates between households and between the household sector and the 
government sector. Following the neoclassical growth and business cycle 
tradition, our first step is to see if this structure can be calibrated to U.S. data 
to mimic selected steady-state observations from the U.S. National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIP A) and from the Federal Flow of Funds Ac-
counts. If the calibration exercise turns out to be successful, the next step is 
to use the calibrated economy to answer some quantitative questions about 
monetary policy issues. One set of these questions is positive in nature and is 
concerned with determining whether monetary policy shocks have had quan-
titatively significant effects on real output and employment. The other set of 
these questions is normative in nature and is concerned with the quantitative 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative monetary policy arrange-
ments. 
Our work builds on imrohoroglu (1992), who studies an economy where 
liquidity-constrained households hold nominal assets as a substitute for 
insurance against idiosyncratic uncertainty. By varying their holdings of these 
assets, households buffer their streams of consumption against bad draws of 
their individual-specific endowment. Her world has a time-invariant interest 
rate and only one nominal asset, and so no possibility of carrying out open 
market operations. Diaz-Gimenez and Prescott (1992) extend her economy to 
include large-denomination, interest-bearing government debt; small-
denomination non-interest-bearing currency; and aggregate uncertainty. They 
3find that open market operations which result in persistent changes in the 
inflation rate have significant real effects on output and employment and that 
these effects are distributed over a multiyear period. Like imrohoroglu 
(1992), Dfaz-Gimenez and Prescott (1992) abstract from financial intermedia-
tion. 
In a related paper, imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991) introduce a banking 
technology to intermediate between the household and government sectors. 
Banks pool households' savings, they purchase large-denomination, interest-
bearing government debt, and they use the returns to pay interest on 
households' demand deposits. imrohoroglu and Prescott use their model to 
evaluate the welfare effects of alternative monetary arrangements. (Computa-
tional difficulties force them to abstract from capital accumulation, which is a 
central element of business cycle fluctuations.) 
In this paper, we introduce capital accumulation into the household sector. 
Households borrow to purchase houses, and they save both to hedge them-
selves against unlucky future times and for retirement. We also model an 
explicit banking sector that intermediates both between households and 
between the household sector and the government sector. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we document the importance of 
the U.S. financial intermediation sector and the borrowing and lending rate 
differentials faced by U.S. households. In section 3 we describe the model 
and define the equilibrium processes. The economy is calibrated to U.S. data 
in section 4. In section 5 we develop a welfare measure based on compensat-
ing households for policy changes. Section 6 reports the results of two sets of 
experiments: one that evaluates the welfare effects of alternative monetary 
arrangements and another that explores the effects and the desirability of a 
procyclical interest rate policy. The final section contains some concluding 
comments. 
2. Financial intermediation: Some facts 
It is a well-known fact that households both borrow from and lend to 
financial intermediaries and that they do so in sizable amounts. Moreover, it 
is also well-known - painfully so for many of us - that the average rate paid 
by households when they borrow is significantly larger than the average rate 
received by households when they lend. A consequence of these two facts is 
that both the value added by and the final product of the U.S. financial 
intermediation sector are significant fractions of total output. Another signif-
icant fact is that the contribution of this sector to both the value added and 
the final product has increased significantly over the last four decades. We 
now quantify these facts for the U.S. economy. 
By households, we mean the decision units that correspond to either 
individuals or families. These decision units can enter into contracts and own 
4Table 1 
U .S. household sector balance sheets for selected years. a 
Stock/ GNP 
1959 1975 1986 
Total assets 3.86 3.64 4.15 
Tangible assets 1.95 2.06 2.09 
Residential structures 0.81 0.84 0.86 
Land 0.52 0.54 0.63 
Plant, equipment, and inventories 0.24 0.31 0.24 
Consumer durables 0.38 0.37 0.36 
Debt assets 1.10 1.17 1.54 
Financial corporate debt 0.64 0.72 0.81 
Pension fund reserves 0.17 0.27 0.48 
Nonfinancial corporate debt 0.09 0.08 O.o7 
Government debt 0.20 0.10 0.18 
Equity assetsb 0.81 0.41 0.52 
Total liabilities 0.45 0.60 0.70 
Owed to 
Financial corporations 0.39 0.55 0.65 
Nonfinancial corporations 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Government 0.01 O.Ql 0.01 
Net worth 3.41 3.04 3.45 
8 Source: Technical appendix I, which is available upon request. 
blncluded is the market value of mutual fund shares (other than money market funds) held by 
households. 
assets, and they make consumption, labor, and saving choices that are 
constrained by a household-specific budget constraint. Note that this finan-
cially based definition of households is significantly different than the one 
used in the NIPA of most countries. In the NIP A, a household is a unit 
which consumes goods and services and supplies factors of production to the 
business sector. The households in our framework, in addition to these 
activities, produce goods and services. Our household sector, therefore, 
includes small businesses such as farms, sole proprietorships, and partner-
ships which the NIP As include in the unincorporated business sector. In our 
framework, as in the NIP As, corporations and government enterprises are 
not included in the household sector. Tables 1 and 2 present balance sheets 
for selected years of the household and the corporate sectors for the U.S. 
economy. 
Some points worth noting are the following: First, almost two-thirds of 
nongovernment tangible assets are owned by the household sector, and only 
one-third is owned by the corporate sector. Second, owner-used real estate 
and consumer durables are a large part of household capital: Indeed, they 
constitute more than two-thirds of the households' tangible assets and over 
5Table 2 
U .S. corporate sector balance sheet for selected years. a 
StockjGNP 
1959 1975 1986 
Total assets 1.76 2.05 2.24 
Tangible assets 0.97 1.06 1.02 
Residential structures 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Land 0.16 0.10 0.12 
Plant, equipment, and inventories 0.80 0.94 0.89 
Debt assets 0.79 0.99 1.22 
Household debt held by financial corporations 0.39 0.65 0.65 
Household debt held by nonfinancial corporations 0.05 0.04 0.04 
Government debt 0.35 0.30 0.53 
Total liabilities 0.96 1.12 1.44 
Owed to households by 
Financial corporations 0.81 0.99 1.29 
Nonfinancial corporations 0.09 0.08 0.07 
Owed to government 0.06 0.05 0.08 
Net worth 0.80 0.93 0.80 
Market value of equities held by households 0.81 0.47 0.52 
Imputed unassigned net liabilitiesb -0.01 0.52 0.28 
a Source: Technical appendix I, which is available upon request. 
bThis is the difference between the net worth category and the market value of equities held 
by households category. We interpret this as representing unmeasured or mismeasured liabilities 
and assets of corporations. 
one-half of the total economy's tangible assets. Owner-occupied housing and 
consumer durables are the components of capital that we introduce into this 
exploratory application of the technology developed in this paper for com-
putable general equilibrium analyses of economies with financial intermedia-
tion. 
We turn now to NIP A data. In table 3, we present the financial intermedi-
ary sector's share of the value added by and the final product of the U.S. 
financial intermediation sector for selected years in the postwar period. From 
the point of view of our framework, these numbers understate the impor-
tance of financial intermediation. The reason that they are underestimated is 
that some financial intermediary services are used by business in our house-
hold sector and therefore are treated as intermediate goods in the NIP A 
reporting system. For this reason we also report the total product of the 
financial intermediary sector. These total product numbers overstate the 
importance of the financial intermediation sector because some of this 
product is an intermediate good to the corporate sector. Financial intermedi-
ation is large: it was between 5 and 7 percent of GNP in the early 1980s. 
6Table 3a 
U.S. financial sector data in selected years: Value added by subsectors.a 
Percent of GNP 
1950 1960 1970 1980 
Banking and credit agencies other 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.1 
than banks 
Insurance carriers, insurance agents, 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.8 
brokers, and seiVices 
Other subsectorsb 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total finance and insurance sectorc 2.7 3.7 3.7 4.4 
1989 
2.7 
1.9 
0.9 
5.6 
aSources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis: (i) The NIPA of 
U.S., 1929-82 Statistical Tables; (ii) SuiVey of Current Business, Vol. 71, 1991: January (No. 1), 
April (No. 4), July (No. 7), and September 1965 (No. 9); (iii) Staff Papers 29 and 39. For Bad 
Debt: Statistics of Income, Corporate Income Tax Return, I.R.S., U.S. Department of Treasury, 
1958, 1967, 1976, and 1982. 
bThis includes the categories security commodity brokers, seiVices, and holdings and other 
investment companies. 
cComponents may not add to totals due to rounding. 
Table 3b 
U.S. financial sector data in selected years: Industry product, final product, and bad debt. a 
Percent of GNP 
1958 1967 1976 1982 
Industry product 5.8 5.8 6.1 7.6 
Final product 2.7 3.1 3.2 4.1 
Value-added 3.2 3.2 3.1 4.0 
Bad debt 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
aSources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis: (i) The NIPA of 
U.S., 1929-82 Statistical Tables; (ii) SuiVey of Current Business, Vol. 71, 1991: January (No. 1), 
April (No. 4), July (No. 7), and September 1965 (No. 9); (iii) Staff Papers 29 and 39. For Bad 
Debt: Statistics of Income, Corporate Income Tax Return, I.R.S., U.S. Department of Treasury, 
1958, 1967, 1976, and 1982. 
Table 4 reports, for the United States in 1986, stocks and average interest 
rates paid on various categories of household borrowing and lending to banks 
and other financial intermediaries. Even for collateralized mortgage loans, 
the average interest rate is nearly 4 percent higher than the return on bank 
certificates of deposit. The spread between borrowing and lending rates 
increases if the borrowing is in the form of uncollateralized loans and the 
lending is in the form of deposits on which the household can write checks. 
In this latter case, the difference is in excess of 10 percent. 
Finally, we turn to the U.S. housing sector. Most of this sector's final 
product is the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing. Table 5 reports the 
7Table 4 
Selected U.S. household sector borrowing and lending stocks and interest rates, 1986.3 
Borrowing 
Year-end outstanding stocks 
Mortgages 
Consumer credit 
Bank loans 
Average net interest rates 
New mortgagesb 
New car, 48 months 
Personal credit, 24 months 
Credit card 
Prime rate 
Lending 
Year-end outstanding stocks 
Checkable deposits & currency 
Time depositsc 
U.S. government securitiesd 
Average net interest rates 
NOW accounts 
Certificates of deposit, 6 months 
U.S. T-bill, 6 months 
StockjGNP 
0.60 
0.16 
0.04 
10.2% 
14.0 
16.5 
18.3 
8.3 
StockjGNP 
0.13 
0.56 
0.14 
5.0% 
6.7 
6.3 
•sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: (i) Balance Sheets for the U.S. 
Economy 1949-90, Flow of Funds, September 1991; (ii) Annual Statistical Digest 1986; (iii) 
Money Stocks, Liquid Assets and Debt Measures, 1986. 
bThis is an effective rate on conventional mortgage. It includes fees and charges, assuming 
repayment at the end of ten years. 
cThis includes small and large time deposits and money market fund shares. 
dThis includes savings bonds, agency issues, and other Treasury issues. 
total and the owner-occupied housing sectors imputed rental income state-
ments for 1986. These numbers will be used in the calibration of our model 
economy to U.S. data. 
3. The model economy 
3.1. Population dynamics 
Our economy is inhabited by a large number of households at each point in 
time. Some of these households do not survive to the following period. The 
number (actually, measure) of new households each period is equal to the 
number that did not survive from the previous period. Consequently, the 
population size is constant. At each date t, each household is indexed by an 
idiosyncratic factor s1• This factor belongs to a finite set S = {1, 2, ... , nJ 
These factors affect a household's consumption possibility set, utility flow 
8Table 5 
U.S. housing sector profit and loss statement, 1986; values as percent of GNP! 
Rentsb 
Less maintenance, insurance, and repair 
Equals value added 
Property taxesc 
Depreciation 
Wages 
Interest payments 
Rental incomed 
Corporate profits 
Owner-occupied 
housing sector 
7.2% 
1.0 
6.1 
1.2 
1.6 
3.6 
-0.3 
Total 
housing sector 
9.9% 
1.6 
8.3 
1.4 
2.3 
0.1 
4.4 
0.0 
0.1 
a Sources: Survey of Current Business, July 1990, Vol. 70, No. 7, Table 8.9, p. 101, and Table 
1.23, p. 49. 
bFor owner-occupied housing sector, imputed rent. 
clndirect business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies plus 
current surplus of government enterprises. 
dRental income of persons plus proprietor's income. 
function, and probability of dying. The nature of these stochastic processes 
will be specified after we have specified the exogenous economy-wide 
stochastic process, {zJ. This process follows a finite state Markov chain with 
transition probabilities given by 
7T2 ( z'lz) = Pr{ Z 1 + 1 = z'lz1 = z}, (1) 
where z E Z = {1, 2, ... , n
2
}. We assume that the Markov chain generating z 
is such that it has a single ergodic set, no transient states, and no cyclically 
moving subsets. 
Each household faces an idiosyncratic random disturbance, s0 to its 
individual production opportunities. Conditional on the realization of the 
economy-wide shock one period ahead, these idiosyncratic disturbances are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed across households. 
The process for these household-specific production shocks is assumed to 
follow a finite state Markov chain with conditional transition probabilities 
given by 
7T5 (s'is,z') =Pr(st+I =s'ls1 =s,zt+ 1 =z'), (2) 
where s, s' E S = {1, 2, ... , n5 } and z' E Z. 
The state ns is an absorbing state and corresponds to death. We use a(s) 
to indicate whether or not a person is alive at a point in time. A person is 
9alive at t if u(s1 ) = 1 and is dead if u(s1 ) = 0. Therefore, the function 
u(s) = 0 fors= ns and u(s) = 1 fors< n
5
• 
The joint processes on each household's idiosyncratic shock, s, and on the 
economy-wide shock, z, are therefore Markov chains with n = nsnz states. 
Their transition probabilities are 
'1T [ ( s' , z' ) I ( s , z ) ] = '1T z ( z' I z) '1T5 ( s' Is, z' ) . (3) 
The state spaceS X Z of the Markov chain on (s, z) can be partitioned into a 
finite number of ergodic sets Sh X Z for h = 1, ... , nh and one transient set 
T. We assume that the chain is such that it has no cyclically moving subsets. 
The initial measure of agents with sE sh is A h. Given that the probability 
that s1 E Sh is always one, the measure of households of type h is time-
invariant. 
3.2. The government sector 
The government in this economy taxes labor and net interest income at a 
rate 8. This is a proportional tax and is restricted to be a function of the 
current value of the economy-wide shock, z0 only. The tax rate at date t is 
8(z 1 ). The government also issues two assets. The first asset bears no interest, 
and it determines the unit of account. We denote it by R, and we call it 
reserves. The second asset is a riskfree promise to deliver one unit of currency 
at the beginning of the period immediately after its date of issue. This asset 
sells at a discount. We denote it by B, and we call it a T-bill. (Note that 
throughout this paper we follow the convention that capital letters denote 
nominal quantities and, except where otherwise indicated, lower-case letters 
denote the real values of the corresponding variables in terms of current-
period prices.) 
Variable p 1 is the price of one unit of the date t composite good. 
Government policy determines the pricing process on reserves, e1 = E(z1 ) = 
p 1+ 1jp0 and the nominal interest rate on government debt, i 1 = t(z1 ), where 
the interest is paid in advance. To implement these policies, the government 
exchanges goods and currency at a price p 1 and sells and buys promises to 
deliver one unit of nominal value next period at price 1- t(z 1 ). We only 
consider economies with a positive nominal interest rate policy, that is, where 
t( z) ;;:: 0 for all z E Z. To induce a demand for the lower-yielding reserves, 
the government requires banks to keep at least a fraction p1 = p(z1 ) of their 
customers' deposits in reserves. Additional legal constraints preclude house-
holds from holding T-bills directly. Only the financial intermediaries have 
access to the T-bill market. Note that the pricing policies and the reserve 
requirement policy are also restricted to being a function of the current value 
of the economy-wide shock, z 0 only. 
10
At date t, the government makes real transfers to households. The transfer 
is contingent on the economy-wide shock z 1 and upon the household's real 
financial assets, a 1 , its tangible assets, k 1 , and its idiosyncratic shock, s 1 • The 
transfer policy is w(a, k, s, z). Finally, the government taxes households' 
estates. When a household dies, its estate is liquidated and the proceeds are 
used to pay off its debts. The remaining assets of the estate, if any, are 
subject to a 100 percent estate tax. 
A government policy rule is, therefore, a specification of [s(z), 
t(z), ll(z), p(z), w(a, k, s, z)] and the associated processes on government 
consumption, g, on the government supply of T-bills, Bt;, and on the 
government supply of reserves, R~;. 
3.3. The banking sector 
Banks play two major roles in our model economies. Their first role is to 
intermediate between households by making loans to households who want 
to borrow and by accepting deposits from households who want to lend. 
Their second role is to intermediate between the household and government 
sectors, by pooling household savings and buying government-issued 
interest-bearing debt and non-interest-bearing reserves. 
We assume that both the deposit and the lending technologies are freely 
accessible and that they display constant returns-to-scale. Associated with the 
deposit technology is a cost, 1Jn, per unit of value intermediated. Associated 
with the lending technology is also a cost, 1Jv per unit of value loaned. 
Interest is paid in advance. Given these facts, each period banks solve the 
following static maximization problem: 
max Bb + Rb + Lb- Db, 
Bh, Lh, Rh, Dh 
(4) 
subject to 
Bb(l-i) +Lb(l-iL) +Rb+YJnD+YJLL ~Db(l-in), (5) 
Rb z_ pDb, (6) 
Lb,Rb,Dbz.O. (7) 
Here Bb denotes bank purchases of government interest-bearing debt, Lb 
denotes bank loans to the household sector, Rb denotes bank holdings of 
reserves, Db denotes household deposits accepted, and i L and iD denote, 
respectively, the nominal interest rates on loans and deposits. Constraint (5) 
is the cash-flow constraint while (6) is the reserve requirement. The objective 
function is the end-of-period assets of the bank. 
11
Given that we only consider policies with a positive nominal rate of return 
on interest-bearing government debt, T-bills dominate reserves in rate of 
return. Consequently, at an optimum, inequality (6) holds with equality. For 
optima to exist with strictly positive Db and Lb, the interest rates must satisfy 
the following conditions: 
(8) 
(9) 
Perfect competition and constant returns-to-scale imply that equilibrium 
bank profits are zero. Note also that, from eqs. (8) and (9), we can obtain the 
difference between the household borrowing and lending rates: 
(10) 
Our model economy has no features that prevent households from default-
ing on their loans. To make the lending technology incentive-compatible, 
banks require collateral for their loans. Effectively, households can only 
borrow up to the resale value of their end-of-period capital. 
3.4. The household sector 
3.4.1. Preferences 
Households are only concerned with their future consumption and leisure 
if they are alive. Consequently, they order their random streams of these 
goods according to 
E L j3 1u( s1) [ U1( C1 , k;, 7 -- n~' S1) + U2 ( g 1)], (11) 
1~0 
where U1 and U2 are continuous and strictly concave utility functions, f3 is 
the time-discount factor, c 1 is household consumption which is restricted to 
being nonnegative, k; E K = {0, 1, ... , nk} represents the services of the capi-
tal goods and consumer durables held by the household during period t, 7 is 
a household's endowment of productive time, n1 is labor, and g 1 is public per 
capita consumption. Hence, 7- n 1 is time allocated by the household to 
nonmarket activities, which we call leisure. 
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3.4.2. Productive opportunities 
The household's date t production of the composite good is 
(12) 
where w(s, z) is that household's technology parameter. This composite good 
can be transformed into consumption, investment, banking services, or capi-
tal maintenance services on a one-to-one basis. When they choose to work, 
agents are paid their marginal product. Therefore, w(s, z) equals the house-
hold's real wage. Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), we assume 
labor indivisibility. Hours of labor services provided, n~' are constrained to 
belong to the set {0, 1}. Zero corresponds to not being employed and one to 
being employed. 
3.4.3. Initial endowments and liquidation of assets 
Households are born with no initial endowment of assets. When their time 
comes to die, they do so overnight, after the current-period labor, consump-
tion, investment, and savings have taken place. Early the next morning, their 
estates are liquidated. Their capital goods are transformed into units of the 
current-period composite good and are sold in the market. The proceeds of 
this sale are used to pay off the household's loans, if any. Whatever is left 
over, together with the remainder of the estate, is taxed away. 
3.4.4. Capital maintenance and disinvestment 
We assume that household capital has to be maintained. Each period 
households incur a cost of J.L units of that period's composite good per unit of 
capital used during that period. We also assume that there is an irreversibility 
in the capital accumulation process. When a household decides to sell part of 
its capital stock, k > 0 units of capital are transformed into cf>k units of the 
composite good, where 0 < cf> < 1. 
3.4.5. The households' decision problem 
Let D1 denote the nominal household deposits, L 1 the nominal household 
debt, A 1 the beginning-of-period nominal asset holdings, and xf and x: 
current-period purchases and sales of investment goods. Then the nominal 
version of the household competitive decision problem is 
The objective function 
maxE I: {3 1u( S1 )U1( C1 , k;, 7'- n 1 , S1), 
t~O 
(13) 
13
subject to the following constraints, one for each t = 0, 1, 2, ... : 
Budget Constraint 
(14) 
where 
(15) 
Borrowing Constraint 
(16) 
Law of Motion of Wealth 
( 17) 
Law of Motion of Capital 
(18) 
The maximization is also subject to next period's real financial assets, 
A 1+ 1 jp1+ 1, belonging to the finite set A,
2 n 1 belonging to {0, 1} and k; 
belonging to the finite set K, given A 0 and k 0 • 
Let d = Dtfp1 denote household real deposits and 11 = Ltfp1 denote 
household real loans, both valued in terms of the current period's composite 
good, and let a1 =A 1/P1 denote the beginning-of-period real assets. Then the 
functional equation for the dynamic program solved by an (a, k, s)-type 
2 In our model economies, the units of A determine the smallest denomination of household 
assets. In general, the A units do not coincide with the unit of account. As is true in most 
modern economies, the unit of account in our model is the unit of denomination of non-
interest-bearing government debt. This unit of account, however, need not coincide with the 
smallest unit of currency issued. In the United States, for example, the unit of account is the 
dollar while the smallest currency unit is the cent. In other countries, like Italy, the smallest 
current unit 10 liras, is a multiple of the unit of account, the lira. 
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household is the following: 
v(a,k,s,z) = max {cr(s)U1(c,k',T-n,s) 
c, n, d,l, xd,xs, a', k' 
+ f3 s~' v ( a' , k' , s' , z' ) 7T [ ( s' , z' ) I ( s, z ) ] } , 
subject to 
c + xd + d + JLk' 5. a + [ 1- 8( z) ][ w( s, z )n +diD( z) -li L( z)] 
15. <f>k'e( z), 
a'5.(d-l)je(z), 
k' = k +xd -x5 j<f>, 
+x5 +l+w(a,k,s,z), 
( 19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
and also subject to a' EA, k' E K, nE {0, 1}, and a, k given. Since the 
household's problem is a finite-state, discounted dynamic program, an opti-
mal stationary Markov plan always exists. 
3.5. Definition of equilibrium 
In the goods and securities markets, the government is not small, so 
treating it as just another price-taking agent is not reasonable. Instead, part 
of the specification of the economy must be the policy arrangement em-
ployed. Features of our explicit arrangement include what markets operate 
and what rules govern banks. Another feature of our policy arrangement is 
that at each date the government exchanges goods for deposits at price p,. 
Furthermore, these prices satisfy Pr+l =p,s(z). Also, there is a reserve 
requirement p(z) and an income tax rate 8(z). Finally, the government issues 
as many T-bills to banks at price 1- t(z) as they demand. For such arrange-
ments we now define a recursive equilibrium. 
The state of a household is the four-tuple (a, k, s, z). The measure of 
agents of type (a, k, s) is y(a, k, s). We let y denote the corresponding 
measure. The economy-wide state is the pair (y, z). 
An equilibrium for a policy arrangement {s(z), t(z), 8(z), p(z), w(a, k, s, z)}, 
given y 0 , consists of six basic parts: a government policy {g(y, z), bg(Y, z), 
r/y, z)}, a household policy {c(a, k, s, z), d(a, k, s, z), l(a, k, s, z), 
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subject to the following constraints, one for each t = 0, 1, 2, ... : 
Budget Constraint 
(14) 
where 
(15) 
Borrowing Constraint 
( 16) 
Law of Motion of Wealth 
(17) 
Law of Motion of Capital 
(18) 
The maximization is also subject to next period's real financial assets, 
At+ 1jp1 + 1, belonging to the finite set A,
2 n 1 belonging to {0, 1} and k; 
belonging to the finite set K, given A 0 and k 0 . 
Let d = Dtfp1 denote household real deposits and 11 = L 1 jp1 denote 
household real loans, both valued in terms of the current period's composite 
good, and let a1 =A 1 jp1 denote the beginning-of-period real assets. Then the 
functional equation for the dynamic program solved by an (a, k, s)-type 
2 In our model economies, the units of A determine the smallest denomination of household 
assets. In general, the A units do not coincide with the unit of account. As is true in most 
modern economies, the unit of account in our model is the unit of denomination of non-
interest-bearing government debt. This unit of account, however, need not coincide with the 
smallest unit of currency issued. In the United States, for example, the unit of account is the 
dollar while the smallest currency unit is the cent. In other countries, like Italy, the smallest 
current unit 10 liras, is a multiple of the unit of account, the lira. 
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n(a, k, s, z), xd(a, k, s, z), x'(a, k, s, z), a'(a, k, s, z): k'(a, k, s, z)}, a banking 
policy {bb(y, z), lb(y, z), rb(y, z), db(y, z)}, z-contingent interest rates 
{iD( z ), i L ( z ), i( z)}, an inflation rate process e( z ), and a law of motion for the 
measures of agent types y~'k's' = fa'k's'(y, z, z') such that: 
(i) Given the process on iD(z), iL(z), e(z), and O(z), the household policy 
solves the household's optimization program described in eqs. (19)-(23) 
above. 
(ii) Given the process on i(z), iL(z), iD(z), and p(z), the banking policy 
solves the banking maximization program described in eqs. (4)-(7) 
above. 
(iii) The goods market clears: 
L y(a,k,s)[c(a,k,s,z) +xd(a,k,s,z) +d(a,k,s,z)TJD 
a,k,s 
+l(a,k,s,z)TJL +p,k'(a,k,s,z)] +g(y,z) 
= L y(a,k,s)[n(a,k,s,z)w(s,z) +xs(a,k,s,z)], (24) 
a, k,s 
for all (y, z) in the support of the distribution of (yl' z 1 ) for some t. 
(iv) The asset markets clear: 
(25) 
lb(y,z)= L y(a,k,s)l(a,k,s,z), (26) 
a, k,s 
(27) 
db(y,z) = L y(a,k,s)d(a,k,s,z). (28) 
a, k,s 
(v) Household and aggregate behavior are consistent: 
fa'k's'(y, z, z') 
y(a, k, s)1T[(s', z')l(s, z)] + ifia'k's'' (29) 
a, k, s EA(a', k', z) 
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where 
A(a',k',z) 
= { (a, k, s) : a' = ( d (a, k, s, z) - l (a, k, s, z) }/ e ( z) , 
k'=k(a,k,s,z) +xd(a,k,s,z) 
-x 5 (a, k, s, z)/4>}, 
and where 1./J specifies the measure of types for the newborn. In our 
world, all the mass of 1./J is on (a', k') pairs for which a' = k' = 0, and the 
total measure of those who are born is equal to the measure of those 
who die. 
(vi) The behavior of endogenous variables is consistent with the policy 
arrangement. For our class of policy arrangements, this requires e(z) = 
'E(z), i(z) = L(z), and g(y, z) ;:c: 0 for all (y, z) in the support of the 
distribution of (yP zt) for some t. 
For the set of policy arrangements that we consider, there is at most one 
equilibrium. The computational procedure we use to find the equilibrium is 
to first solve the household problem, which is a finite-state discounted 
dynamic program, and then use (24) to determine g(y, z). If the gt = g(yn zt) 
is a positive stochastic process, we have found the unique equilibrium given 
the policy arrangement. Otherwise, we have established that no equilibrium 
exists for that policy arrangement. (Technical appendix 11, which is available 
upon request, describes in considerable detail our computation procedure.) 
4. Calibration 
Without aggregate uncertainty, the equilibrium path of our model economy 
converges to a unique steady state with a fixed distribution of households as 
indexed by their individual state (a, k, s). Steady-state interest rates, aggre-
gate stocks, and aggregate flows are constant. We calibrate our economy so 
that selected steady-state statistics are close to the corresponding statistics 
for the U.S. economy in the post-Korean War period. 
4.1. Model period 
We want to match some model statistics with quarterly data, so we select 
our model period so that a quarter of a year is an integer multiple of a model 
period. Because we want some temporal aggregation and computational costs 
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increase with the number of model periods per year, we select the model 
period to be one-eighth of a year. 
4.2. Government policy 
We select a nominal return on government debt of 5 percent (annually), an 
inflation rate of 4 percent, a reserve requirement of 1 percent, and an income 
tax rate of 0.20. With these numbers the before-tax real return on govern-
ment debt is 1 percent, which is in line with the U.S. historical average. 
Retired households who have no assets receive welfare payments equal to 
about one-sixth of the average earnings of the working-age population. 
4.3. Banking technology 
We calibrate to a nominal interest rate on deposits of 4 percent and a 
nominal loan rate of 9.5 percent. These interest rates, along with the policy 
parameters, imply the 1JD and 1JL parameter values. 
4. 4. Population dynamics 
For borrowing and lending to reach the desired level, we introduce a 
retirement state s = 3, as well as two working-age states s = 1 and s = 2. 
State s = 1 corresponds to the productivity of that household's labor time 
being high; state s = 2 corresponds to ;Jroductivity of that household's labor 
time being low. Productivity in state 2 is 32 percent of the productivity in 
state 1. We think of state s = 2 as corresponding to a minimum-wage job 
opportunity. 
The working life of an individual is geometrically distributed, with an 
expected duration of 33 years. The retirement life of our individuals is also 
geometrically distributed. The expected duration of retirement is 10 years. 
State s = 4 corresponds to death. Each period, the measure of those who are 
born is equal to the measure of those who die. As a result, total population is 
constant. 
Following imrohoroglu (1992), we select the transition probabilities be-
tween states 1 and 2 to be such that the expected time a worker spends in 
state s = 2 is three model periods, and the expected time a worker spends in 
state s = 1 is 27 model periods. This implies that, each period of time, 90 
percent of the workers have the high productivity parameter and 10 percent 
the low productivity parameter. These parameter values produce annual 
income fluctuations of household labor income of the magnitude reported in 
U.S. household surveys. For newborns, the probability of being type s = 1 is 
0.9 and that of being type s = 2 is 0.1. 
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4.5. Household preferences for private consumptions 
The set of possible housing stocks is K = {0, 3}. A household with k = 3 
corresponds to a family owning a house with a value three times its annual 
income. This ratio is twice as large as the typical ratio for U.S. households. 
The reason we select this larger number is that we want the model's 
household capital stock to match the U.S. household capital stock, which 
includes consumer durables and small business capital. 
For workers (s = 1 or s = 2) with k = 3, the utility function of private 
consumption is 
We select T = 2.22 so that n = 1 corresponds to people working, including 
commuting, 45 hours of the lOO weekly hours of productive time. The 
parameter a is selected so that this 45 hour workweek is near the optimal 
one. [See Kydland and Prescott (1991).] The ak is selected so that k = 3 
would be optimal if the household rented housing services at a rate equal to 
the sum of the real after-tax interest rate on borrowing and the maintenance 
and operations cost. This maintenance and operating cost J.L is set to 0.05. 
Workers (s = 1 or s = 2) who have no capital (k = 0) can transform the 
composite good at rate 1/y into housing services. Their indirect utility is 
U1( c, 0, n, s) = max[ cf-akcfk( T- n )
1-a]'-1/1 /(1- if;), 
subject to 
c1 +yc2 :o:;c. 
We select y equal to twice the sum of the real borrowing rate and the 
maintenance cost J.L = 0.05. This y is sufficiently large that owning a house 
dominates renting housing services, so households purchase a house as soon 
as they have enough savings for the required down payment. 
Retirees have productivities w(3, z) = 0. As a result, their wage rate is 
zero, and they select n = 0. Their utility function is simply 
The larger is the parameter or, the more important is consumption during 
retirement relative to consumption during the working period of a person's 
life. Hence, the larger is or, the higher is the equilibrium saving for retire-
ment. The parameter or is selected so that aggregate deposits at banks match 
U.S. data. 
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Table 6a 
Calibrated household parameters. 
Parameter 
Preferences 
Private consumption share 
Capital service share 
Risk aversion 
Time discount factor 
Public consumption constant 
Productive time 
Retirees" constant 
Technology 
Maintenance cost 
Rental service coefficient 
Disinvestment cost 
Real wage: State 1 
State 2 
Probability of newborn being: Type 1 
Type 2 
Table 6b 
JL 
y 
1-<P 
w(l, z) 
w(2, z) 
"'1 
"'2 
Calibrated bank and government parameters. 
Parameter 
Per unit banking costs 
Deposits 
Loans 
Government policy 
Reserve requirement 
Tax rate on labor & interest income 
Nominal interest rate on T-bills 
Inflation rate process 
Welfare transfers to: 
In dig en t retirees 
Others 
Table 6c 
p(z) 
O(z) 
L(Z) 
s(z) 
w(O, 0, 3, z) 
w(a, k, s, z) 
Calibrated household idiosyncratic shock transition probabilities. 
To next period, state s' 
From this period, state s 2 3 
Working age 
High productivity 1 0.9593 0.0369 0.0038 
Low productivity 2 0.3317 0.6645 0.0038 
Retired 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.9869 
Dead 4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Value 
0.3330 
0.1080 
4.0000 
0.9994 
0.0104 
2.2200 
0.2100 
0.0500 
0.0270 
0.1000 
0.1250 
0.0400 
0.9000 
0.1000 
Value 
0.0011875 
0.0056250 
0.01000 
0.20000 
0.00625 
1.00500 
0.02000 
0.00000 
4 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0131 
1.0000 
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Table 7a 
Calibrated economy's steady-state balance sheet data. 
Household sector 
Tangible capital 
Deposits 
Loans 
Net worth 
Government sector 
Reserves 
Debt 
Value added by sectors 
Housing 
Banking 
Goods producing 
Products 
Consumption 
Goods 
Housing 
Maintenance 
Banking services 
Government purchases 
Investment 
Table 7b 
Calibrated economy's steady-state NIPA data. 
StockjGNP 
2.71 
1.01 
0.46 
3.26 
0.01 
0.54 
Percent of GNP 
15.74 
3.01 
81.25 
82.61 
50.29 
29.30 
13.56 
3.10 
16.55 
0.84 
The one household preference parameter which turns out to be of small 
importance is 1/J, the risk aversion parameter. Following Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987), we pick 1/J = 4. Results for 1/J = 8 are similar. 
4.6. Household preference for public consumption 
All living households value public consumption by 
The parameter og is selected so that half of the population prefers a higher 
tax rate 8 and the associated higher g and the other half of the population 
prefers a lower e and the associated lower g. 
These considerations lead us to choose the parameter values listed in table 
6. The steady-state statistics for our calibrated economy are reported in table 
7. These statistics are of the same order of magnitude as those for the U.S. 
economy seen in tables 1 and 2. 
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5. Measure of welfare benefits 
Now we develop a measure of the welfare benefits associated with switch-
ing from one policy to another. This measure is based on the compensation 
principle - that is, the sum of how much households must be compensated 
for them to be indifferent between the current policy with the compensation 
and the new policy without the compensation. In the section, we use 7T to 
denote the z-contingent policy rules 7T' = {t:( 0 ), t( 0 ), p( 0 ), e( 0 ), w( 0 )}. 
We define the total wealth W of a household to be the sum of the values of 
its financial assets, a, its tangible capital, k, and its human capital, h: 
W(a,k,s,z) =a +k+h(s,z). (30) 
We define the human capital of a household to be the expected discounted 
value of the household's labor endowment where we use discount factor {3. 
Thus, 
h(s, z) = E{ Lf3 10'(s1 )w(s~' Z 1 )ls0 =s, z0 =z }· 
t 
(31) 
The reason we use discount factor f3 is that our model world does not have a 
single market discount factor because borrowing and lending rates differ. We 
say a household's wealth is scaled by factor A > 0 if that household's a0 , and 
k 0 and all its w(s0 z 1 ) are scaled by factor A. 
Let v2 denote a household's utility value of the public consumptions 
process given that the current policy is 7T' and the current economy state is 
( y, z). The expression for v 2 is 
V 2 ( s' y ' z 17T') = E { L f3 t (}' ( s t ) 0 g g :(I -ljl) I ( 1 - 1/1) I y 0 = y ' z 0 = z ' 7T'} 0 
t 
(32) 
A household's total utility, which includes the value of both private and 
public consumptions, is 
V(a,k,s,y,zi'TT') =v 1(a,k,s,zi7T') +v2 (s,y,zi7T'), (33) 
where v1 is the household's optimal value function v with the policy 
argument 7T' made explicit. 
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For our structure, if the wealth of every household and the welfare 
payments w are scaled by the factor A, the total utility of every household is 
scaled by the factor A"<l-1/Jl. For the v1 part of V, this follows immediately 
from the household's maximization problem (13)-(18). (Note that the integer 
constraints must be modified from k E K to k 1 A E k and from a EA to 
ajA EA.) For the v2 part of V, this result follows because the scaling results 
in the equilibrium {g1} process being scaled by A given that the resource 
balance constraint (24) must hold. 
Let 1r0 denote current policy, (y, z) the current aggregate state, and 1r1 
the alternative policy being evaluated. The compensation factor A is 
(34) 
A household's benefits of switching from policy 7T 0 to 7T 1 is the product of its 
(A - 1) times its wealth W. 
Our welfare measure M is benefits summed over all households alive at 
that point in time divided by wealth summed over all these households. Thus, 
L W(a,k,s,z)[A(a,k,s,y,zi7T 0 ,7T1)-l]y(a,k,s) 
a, k,s 
L W(a,k,s,z)y(a,k,s) (35) 
a, k,s 
If negative, benefits are interpreted as costs. This welfare measure can be 
thought of as corresponding to the benefit of a fractional GNP change that 
persists forever and that is of magnitude M. 
An issue is how much of our welfare measure M is due to changes in 
private consumptions and how much is due to changes in public consump-
tions. We allocate a fraction 
vi( 1r1)- vi( 7To) 
V( 1r1)- V( 1r0 ) 
to private consumptions and a fraction 
V 2( 7TJ) - Vz( 7To) 
V(1r 1)- V(1r0 ) 
to public consumptions. Summing private consumption benefits over all 
households and dividing by total wealth yields a private benefit welfare 
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Table 8 
Benefits of switching to a policy of a zero after-tax real return on deposits. 
Benefits as percent of wealth 
Current after-tax 
Steady-state measure Our measure real return on 
deposits s SI Sz M MI M2 
-2.0% 0.20 2.62 -2.42 0.18 0.57 -0.39 
-4.0 0.41 2.99 -2.58 0.36 1.08 -0.71 
-6.0 0.63 3.42 -2.79 0.56 1.55 -0.99 
measure M 1• Following the analogous procedure for public consumption 
benefits yields welfare measure M 2 for public benefits. The sum of M 1 and 
M 2 is M. 
Our welfare measure differs from the one used previously in general 
equilibrium evaluations of alternative monetary arrangements [imrohoroglu 
(1992) and imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991)]. The measure used in those 
evaluations compares across steady states; transitional dynamics associated 
with switching from one policy to another are ignored. We wonder whether 
the conclusion of these studies would be altered if they used our measure, 
which takes into consideration the transitional dynamics. 
To investigate that, we consider the version of our structure which is 
essentially the same as that used by imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991). This 
version is constructed as follows. We drop capital from the analysis, prohibit 
borrowing from banks, and give households infinite life. The preference 
parameters are a= 0.33, f3 = 0.96, 1/J = 4.0, r = 2.22, and og = 0.039111. 
There are two s states and no aggregate uncertainty. The values of the 
productivities are w(l) = 1.0 and w(2) = 0.4, and the transition probabilities 
are rr(s' = lis= 1) = 0.9565 and rr(s' = 2ls = 2) = 0.50. Intermediation costs 
are zero. 
The policies we evaluate have a 100 percent reserve requirement, so 
p = 1.0. The income tax rate is (} = 0.20. Policies differ only in their inflation 
rate. imrohoroglu and Prescott (1991) found that the feature of a monetary 
arrangement that matters for welfare is the arrangement's after-tax real 
return on liquid assets. For the policy arrangements considered here, the 
equilibrium after-tax real return is just the negative of the inflation rate. 
Table 8 reports the benefits of increasing the after-tax real return on 
savings for both our measure, which takes into consideration transitional 
dynamics, and for the steady-state measure, which is denoted by S. We find 
that total benefits for the two measures are quite close, but the contributions 
of changes in public and private consumptions are quite different. In worlds 
with capital accumulation, we would expect significant differences in the 
25
Table 9 
Welfare benefits of switching to a policy of less-negative after-tax real return on deposits. 
Benefits 
Current policy New policy (percent of wealth) 
Inflation After-tax Inflation After-tax 
rate real return rate real return Total Private Public 
4% -0.7% 4% -0.7% 
5 -1.6 4 -0.7 2.00 0.90 1.10 
6 -2.5 4 -0.7 3.58 1.29 2.29 
measures of total benefits if the policy change significantly altered the 
amount of capital held. 
6. Experiments 
6.1. Experiment I: Welfare effects of alternative monetary arrangements 
Motivation: Does including capital accumulation with household borrow-
ing and lending affect the welfare evaluation of alternative monetary arrange-
ments? In particular, will the welfare analysis of arrangements with differing 
after-tax real returns on deposits yield results similar to those reported in 
table 8? 
Description of experiment: For our calibrated economy, we estimate the 
benefits of increasing the after-tax real return on deposits. This is done by 
considering alternative arrangements with different inflation rates. Except for 
the inflation rate, the specification of the model economies is identical to that 
of the calibrated economy. 
Finding: The welfare benefits of switching to a policy with a less-negative 
after-tax real return are reported in table 9. The finding is that the benefits of 
a less-negative after-tax real return on deposits is greater with household 
borrowing to finance capital accumulation than without it. 
6.2. Experiment!!: Effects of alternative stabilization policies 
Motivation: Does a procyclical real interest rate policy stabilize the econ-
omy, and is such a policy welfare-improving? 
Description of experiment: The calibrated economy is modified by intro-
ducing aggregate productivity shocks. In particular, there are two values of 
the aggregate shock z, and the household shock processes are independent 
of z. Compared to the calibrated economy, the modified economy has 
household productivities that are 2 percent higher when z = 1 and 2 percent 
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lower when z = 2. Thus, w(s, z) has the following structure for this experi-
ment: w(1, 1) = 0.1275, w(l, 2) = 0.1225, w(2, 1) = 0.0408, and w(2, 2) = 0.0392. 
The probability that z does not change is 0.9286 for each state. The average 
duration in a state is therefore 14 periods, or 7 quarters. Thus, the average 
duration of a cycle is 3.5 years, which is the average length of U.S. business 
cycles. 
We consider three real interest rate policies. The benchmark policy uses 
the policy arrangement of the calibration section. Here the real interest rate 
on government debt is fixed at 1 percent independent of z. The procyclical 
policy sets the real interest rate at 2 percent when z = 1 and at 0 percent 
when z = 2. The countercyclical policy sets the real interest rate at 0 percent 
when z = 1 and at 2 percent when z = 2. The procyclical and countercyclical 
policies are obtained by changing the nominal interest rate on government 
debt in the benchmark policy. 
Findings: We find that a procyclical real interest rate policy neither 
stabilizes the economy, nor significantly improves welfare. Switching from the 
benchmark policy to the procyclical policy increases fluctuations in output 
from 1.242 percent to 1.245 percent. [The measure of fluctuations is the 
standard deviation of data which has been logged and then detrended using 
the Hodrick-Prescott method as in Kydland and Prescott (1990).] We also 
find that switching from the benchmark policy to the countercyclical policy 
increases fluctuations in output from 1.242 percent to 1.272 percent. Switch-
ing to the procyclical policy results in a welfare gain of about 0.01 percent of 
wealth, while switching to the countercyclical policy results in a welfare loss 
of about 0.17 percent. 
7. Concluding comments 
In this paper, we develop a computable general equilibrium economy that 
models the banking sector explicitly. Banks intermediate between households 
and between the household sector and the government sector. Households 
borrow from banks to finance their purchases of houses, and they lend to 
banks to save for retirement. Banks pool households savings, and they 
purchase interest-bearing government debt and non-interest-bearing re-
serves. We use this structure to answer two sets of questions - one positive in 
nature that studies the real effects of following a procyclical interest-rate 
policy rule and one normative in nature that evaluates the welfare costs of 
alternative monetary and tax policies. 
From the answers to the first set of questions, we find that following a 
policy that results in a procyclical real rate of return on government debt 
neither stabilizes the economy nor affects welfare significantly. From the 
answers to the second set of questions, we find that the welfare benefits of 
policies that increase the after-tax real return on household savings are very 
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large. These benefits are as large as the Jorgenson and Yun (1990) estimate 
of the benefits of the 1984 tax reform and the Lucas (1990) estimate of the 
benefits resulting from the total elimination of capital taxation. We conclude 
that for the purposes of evaluating the welfare gains of monetary and tax 
policies, financial intermediation is important and it should be modeled 
explicitly. 
These findings indicate that there is much to be learned from the explicit 
modeling of financial intermediation. Two further explorations within this 
general framework are the following: Our findings suggest that the life cycle 
plays an important role in issues related to financial intermediation. In fact, 
in our model economy, most of the lending is accounted for by old house-
holds who save for retirement, and most of the borrowing is accounted for by 
young households who go into debt to finance their purchases of new houses. 
Incorporating the life cycle explicitly into this class of worlds should be a 
feasible extension of this line of research, even though the computational 
costs will rise significantly. 
Another natural extension of this line of research is to model en-
trepreneurs. Their inclusion in this type of model should increase total 
borrowing significantly. The data reported in section 3 establish that the 
unincorporated businesses own a large stock of capital and that this capital is 
financed by borrowing as well as by owners' equity. Like the life-cycle 
extension, including entrepreneurs that purchase both capital and labor 
services into these model economies is conceptually straightforward but 
computationally expensive. Yet a model economy that includes both of these 
features would provide a significantly better framework for monetary and 
fiscal policy evaluation than the models currently available. 
References 
Auerbach, Alan J. and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, 1987, Dynamic fiscal policy (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge). 
Bernanke, Ben S., 1983, Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the 
Great Depression, American Economic Review 73, 257-276. 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler, 1989, Agency costs, net worth, and business fluctuations, 
American Economic Review 79, 14-31. 
Diaz-Gimenez, Javier and Edward C. Prescott, 1992, Liquidity constraints in economies with 
aggregate fluctuations: A quantitative exploration, Research Department staff report no. 149 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN). 
Friedman, Milton and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, 1963, A monetary history of the United States, 
1867-1960 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ). 
Greenwood, Jeremy P. and Stephen D. Williamson, 1989, International financial intermediation 
and aggregate fluctuations under alternative exchange rate regimes, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 23, 401-431. 
Hansen, Gary D., 1985, Indivisible labor and the business cycle, Journal of Monetary Economics 
16, 309-327. 
imrohoroglu, Ay§e, 1992, The welfare cost of inflation under imperfect insurance, Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 16, 79-91. 
28
imrohoroglu, Ay§e and Edward C. Prescott, 1991, Evaluating the welfare effects of alternative 
monetary arrangements, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 15, Sum-
mer, 3-10. 
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Kun Young Yun, 1990, Tax reform and U.S. economic growth, Journal 
of Political Economy 98, 151-193. 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott, 1990, Business cycles: Real facts and a monetary 
myth, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 14, Spring, 3-18. 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott, 1991, Hours and employment variation in business 
cycle theory, Economic Theory 1, 63-81. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr., 1990, Supply-side economics: An analytical review, Oxford Economic 
Papers 42, 293-316. 
Rios-Rull, Victor, 1990, Is the existence of complete contingent markets for aggregate uncer-
tainty quantitatively important?, Working paper (Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 
PA). 
Rogerson, Richard, 1988, Indivisible labor, lotteries, and equilibrium, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 21, 3-16. 
Williamson, Stephen D., 1987, Financial intermediation, business failures, and real business 
cycles, Journal of Political Economy 95, 1196-1216. 
